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Abstract: The financial system is inherently procyclical, as it amplifies the course of economic cycles, and pre-
cisely one of the factors that has been suggested to exacerbate this procyclicality is the Basel regulation on
capital requirements. Aer the recent credit crisis, international regulators have turned their eyes to coun-
tercyclical regulation as a solution to avoid similar episodes in the future. Countercyclical regulation aims at
preventing excessive risk taking during booms to reduce the impact of losses suered during recessions, for
example increasing the capital requirements during the good times to improve the resilience of financial insti-
tutions at the downturn. The Basel Committee has already moved forward towards the adoption of counter-
cyclical measures on a global scale: the Basel III Accord, published in December 2010, revises considerably the
capital requirement rules to reduce their procyclicality. These new countercyclical measures will not be com-
pletely implemented until 2019, so their impact cannot be evaluated yet, and it is a crucial question whether
they will be eective in reducing procyclicality and the appearance of crisis episodes such as the one experi-
enced in 2007-08. For this reason, we present in this article an agent-basedmodel aimed at analysing the eect
of two countercyclical mechanisms introduced in Basel III: the countercyclical buer and the stressed VaR. In
particular, we focus on the impact of these mechanisms on the procyclicality induced by market risk require-
ments and, more specifically, by value-at-risk models, as it is a issue of crucial importance that has received
scant attention in the modeling literature. The simulation results suggest that the adoption of both of these
countercyclical measures improves market stability and reduces the emergence of crisis episodes.
Keywords: Agent-Based Simulation, Financial Markets, Financial Stability, Value-At-Risk, Countercyclical Reg-
ulation, Basel III
Introduction
Background
1.1 The financial system is inherently procyclical, as it amplifies the course of economic cycles. During good times,
risk perception decreases, credit standards become looser and lending expands (Dutt 2013). Access to easy
credit propels asset bubbles, as investors are more optimistic regarding their profitability prospects and are
keener to borrow in order to buy assets (McCoy 2015); in turn, this increases the value of warranties used as
collateral in loans, which fuels credit expansion in a self-fulfilling cycle (Griith-Jones & Ocampo 2009). This
processes reverses during economic recessions: when the economy slows down, corporate profits and house-
hold incomesdecline, which leads financial intermediaries to becomemore cautious and reluctant to lend (Ren
2011). As a result, credit tightens, risk perception increases, collateral value falls and asset bubbles burst (McCoy
2015).
1.2 The recent credit crisis hasbrought to light that financial regulation intensifies economiccyclesand thusexacer-
bates the procyclicality of the financial system (Kowalik 2011; Goodhart 2009). Basel capital requirements force
banks to holdmore capital during crises: as credit quality of counterparties deteriorates during recessions, the
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probability that they fail to meet their obligations increases and so more reserves are needed to cover credit
risk (Kowalik 2011; McCoy 2015). As market volatility and asset correlation increase during downturns, losses
in trading positions become more likely, and so more reserves are needed to cover market risk (Saita 2007).
The higher capital requirements limit the lending ability of banks, and the decrease in credit flow adds to the
weakening of economic conditions (Ren 2011).
1.3 The suggestion that procyclicality is linked to capital requirements is not new, as some economists and reg-
ulators had previously warned about this unintended consequence of the Basel Accords (Kowalik 2011). This
led to some isolated calls for the adoption of countercyclical measures to counteract this eect of regulation
on the financial system (Griith-Jones & Ocampo 2009). Countercyclical regulation aims at preventing exces-
sive risk taking during booms to reduce the impact of losses suered during recessions (Dutt 2013), for example
by increasing the capital requirements during the good times to improve the resilience of financial institutions
during a downturn (Kowalik 2011; McCoy 2015). In the wake of the recent financial crisis however, international
regulators have turned their attention to the problem of procyclicality and what to do about it (McCoy 2015).
Key contributions on how to respond to the crisis (Brunnermeier et al. 2009; Financial Services Authority 2009;
United Nations 2009; de LarosiÃĺre et al. 2009; The University of Warwick 2009) have all pointed to the impor-
tance of countercyclical regulations, and international regulatory bodies have taken the initiative in proposing
countercyclical measures to avoid similar episodes in the future (Griith-Jones & Ocampo 2014).
1.4 Notwithstanding the general commitment to implement countercyclical regulations to reduce the procyclical
eects of finance, only the Basel Committee has moved forward towards the adoption of countercyclical mea-
sures on a global scale1 (Dutt 2013). The Basel III Accord, published in December 2010, revises considerably the
capital requirement rules to reduce their procyclicality (McCoy 2015). The major step in this direction is the in-
troduction of a countercyclical buer that increases the capital requirements in times of credit growth so that
banks can build on these reserves when economic activity contracts (Repullo & Saurina 2011).
1.5 These new countercyclical measures are currently being implemented in a gradual way, and this process will
not be completed before 2019 (Eubanks 2010). As a result, their impact cannot be evaluated yet, and it is a
crucial question whether they will be eective in reducing procyclicality and the appearance of crisis episodes
such as the one experienced in 2007-09. For this reason, we present in this article an agent-basedmodel aimed
at analysing the eect of two countercyclicalmechanisms introduced in Basel III: the countercyclical buer and
stressed VaR.
1.6 The reinforcing dynamics of financial procyclicality are driven by amultitude of factors, including credit supply,
collateral value, credit ratings, opinion contagionand riskmanagementmodels (Griith-Jones&Ocampo2009;
McCoy 2015; Dutt 2013). We are focusing on the eect of countercyclicalmeasures on the procyclicality induced
bymarket risk requirements, that is, the capital requirementsmeant to cover the losses in trading books caused
by movements in market prices (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 1996). More specifically, we are fo-
cusing on the procyclicality induced by value-at-riskmodels, as this has causedmany losses to banks since the
2007 crisis started (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009), but has received far less attention in the
literature (see section on literature review below).
VaR-induced procyclicality
1.7 Value-at-risk (VaR) measures the maximum loss that an asset portfolio is expected to suer over a given time
horizon at a specified level of confidence (Choudhry 2013). For example, if the daily VaR of a portfolio is AC 1
million at 95%confidence, thismeans that theprobability that daily losses are higher thanAC 1million is 5%. VaR
constitutes an intuitive measure that was initially used to communicate financial risks to managers in an easy,
understandable way. However, it has also been increasingly used to set position limits to traders, to allocate
capital among dierent trading units, and to calculate the regulatory capital required under Basel Accords for
market risk (Jorion 2001).
1.8 VaR models, as any other risk management system, are meant to keep financial institutions out of trouble by,
among other things, guiding investment decisions within established risk limits so that the viability of a busi-
ness is not put unduly at risk in a sharp market downturn. However, some researchers have warned that the
widespread use of VaRmodels creates negative externalities in financialmarkets, as it can feedmarket instabil-
ity and result in what has been called endogenous risk, that is, risk caused and amplified by the system itself,
rather than being the result of an exogenous shock (Daníelsson & Shin 2003). Financial institutions usually set
VaR limits to their traders or units, which are forced to reduce their positionswhen the risk exceeds these limits.
When volatility increases, the VaR of trading portfolios also goes up and so traders can be forced to reduce their
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positions, but their sales can cause a price drop and so a new volatility upsurge, triggering further portfolio re-
ductions. Whenmany investors hold similar positions and also use the same type of riskmanagementmodels,
they may be forced to simultaneously sell the same assets, leading to a downward spiral in prices (Daníelsson
et al. 2001; Persaud 2000).
1.9 Risk management controls such as those proposed by the Basel Accords can therefore paradoxically facilitate
the contagious spread of instabilities: They contribute to synchronise the behaviour of market participants,
which may be forced to liquidate part of their positions simultaneously (International Monetary Fund 2007;
Whitehead 2013). The impact of these liquidationswould be negligible if investors had very dierent portfolios,
as the sellos by some agents would have less direct eects on those with dierent positions. Nevertheless,
there is empirical evidence that hedge funds and big banks tend to accumulate similar positions over time,
especially in popular trading strategies (Pericoli & Sbracia 2010; Haldane & May 2011). Several regulators have
previously warned of this risk to market liquidity (Bank of England 2004; European Central Bank 2007).
1.10 The procyclicality induced bymarket risk capital requirements has led the Basel Committee to introducewithin
the Basel III Accord an additional countercyclical measure beyond the wide-ranging countercyclical buer:
stressedVaR.Whereas the countercyclical buer is intended to cover all risk categories, stressedVaR specifically
addresses market risk (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009). This is calculated as the value-at-risk
of the portfolio, but “based on a continuous 12-month period of significant financial stress" (Basel Committee
on Banking Supervision 2010, p. 3). For example, banks could use historical data from 2007-08, when the credit
crisis went through its worstmoments and financial instability was at its highest. With the adoption of stressed
VaR, banks will need to have higher capital reserves to cover market risk, and it is expected that this will con-
tribute to preventing losses in trading books from exceeding the minimum capital requirements as happened
at some points during the 2007-08 crisis (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2009).
Review of model literature
1.11 This paper analyses the eect of two countercyclical mechanisms introduced in Basel III on financial stability.
Other researchers have already presentedmodels to explore the impact of countercyclical regulations, and we
provide next a review of this literature. Most of these models are equilibrium-based, but also a fewmultiagent
models have been developed that are of special interest to us, since our research builds on the agent-based
paradigm.
1.12 Da Silva & Lima (2015) use an agent-based macroeconomic model to analyse the eect of dierent combina-
tions ofmonetary policy and prudential regulation – a countercyclical capital buer as in Basel III – onmacroe-
conomic and financial stability. Regarding the eect of the countercyclical buer, the simulations show that us-
ing countercyclical capital requirements is eective against financial instability, but its eect diminishes when
used together with themonetary policies. Popoyan et al. (2016) also use amacroeconomic agent-basedmodel
to study the individual and combined impact of dierent macroprudential regulations and monetary policies
onmacroeconomic stability, and show that the combination of the dierent instruments introduced in Basel III
has a greater eect than the sum of their individual contribution. The combination of a triple-mandate Taylor
rule with Basel III regulation is the most eective policy to improve stability. However, the adoption of a coun-
tercyclical buer together with minimum capital requirements is also quite eective and involves much less
complexity.
1.13 Some papers focus only on the Basel III Accord, without studying its interactions with other types of measures
such as monetary policies. Krug et al. (2014) focus on the dierent micro- and macroprudential instruments
implemented in Basel III to study their combined eect on financial stability. They use a stock-flow consistent
agent-based macroeconomic model to test the possible combinations of the measures introduced in Basel III
Accord. Similar to Popoyan et al. (2016), the authors conclude that the joint eect of the regulatorymeasures is
stronger than the sum of their contributions in isolation. In particular, the countercyclical capital buer turns
out to be very beneficial to reduce procyclicality and improve financial stability. Cincotti et al. (2012) extend the
Eurace model (Cincotti et al. 2011) to explore the eect of two possible implementations of the countercyclical
capital requirements – one based onmacroeconomic conditions and the other on banking activity – on several
economic indicators. Results show that countercyclical requirements improve long-term economic stability
and the main indicators, especially when adopting the formulation based on banking activity.
1.14 Although most of these contributions focus on the macroeconomic scenario, there are also a few models that
explore the impact of countercyclical measures on financial markets and therefore are a bit closer to our own
research. Aymanns & Farmer (2015) present a model where fundamentalist investors set a maximum leverage
JASSS, 22(1) 6, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3927
limit which is linked to a VaR limit, and study the eect of turning from a procyclical regulation to a counter-
cyclical one through a dynamic adjustment of their maximum leverage level; when maximum leverage is pro-
portional tovolatility, the resultingmarketdynamicsarecountercyclical and themarketbecomesmore resilient
to negative price shocks. Hermsen (2012a,b) builds on a previous model of artificial investors (Franke & West-
erho 2012) to test whether the measures introduced in Basel III Accord contribute to financial stability. The
results show that stressed VaR contributes to stabilising the market when the number of investors subject to
capital requirements is lowormedium, andusing stressedVaR ismore eective thanadding the countercyclical
buer in order to reduce market volatility.
1.15 Although our own research shares with the existing contribution in this field the common objective of under-
standingwhether countercyclical regulatorymeasures are beneficial, we provide here a newapproach andper-
spective. Instead of focusing on the credit activity of banks, as done in most revised papers, we turn our atten-
tion to the trading activity of financial entities and in particular, of banks. Proprietary trading has expanded
a lot in the banking industry (House of Lords 2013) and its eect needs to be duly understood. So, instead of
focusing onmacroeconomy as done in the previous articles, we study the impact of countercyclical regulation
on financial markets; instead of focusing on the procyclicality induced by the credit cycle, we concentrate on
the procyclicality induced by the riskmanagement of trading activities. Apart from setting up a countercyclical
capital buer, Basel III introduces stressed VaR as a specific mechanism to deal with this type of procyclicality.
However, it has not received any attention in the available modelling literature aside from the work done by
Hermsen. Our article will contribute to this gap in current research by modeling the eect of the countercycli-
cal buer and stressed VaR on a range of instability indicators that will provide a wider perspective on market
behaviour under this type of regulations.
1.16 The remainderof thepaper is organisedas follows. InSection2wepresentour agent-basedmodel anddescribe
howmarket stability ismeasured. In Section 3we summarise the procyclical eect of VaR position limits on the
pricedynamics and themarket stability, and inSection4westudyandcomparehow theuseof a countercyclical
buer or stressed VaR can improve market resilience. Section 5 then concludes our discussion.
Model Description
2.1 We consider a market for a single risky asset – a stock – in unrestricted supply, where traders place orders at
discrete trading intervals, changing the composition of their investment portfolios in accordance with their
respective valuationmodel and, in the casewhere portfolio risk limits apply, with a Value-at-Risk (VaR)model2.
Price formation
2.2 The price Pt for the stock is set by a market maker in accordance to a linear price formation rule. Although
other formulations are possible (see also Madhavan 2000 for a survey), we use the simplest one, which states
that prices have to rise (fall) in the presence of over-demand (over-supply) by an amount that is inversely pro-
portional to the liquidity of the traded security. Here, we do not take into account the inventory of the market
maker nor the presence of information asymmetries in themarket, and thus assumebid-ask spreads to be zero.
Stock price is updated according to:
Pt = Pt−1 +
1
λ
·Θt−1 + ζt, (1)
where
• Θt−1 is the total excess order, that is the sum of all orders emitted in t− 1
• λ is a constant liquidity factor that accounts for the depth of the market
• ξt is a random term, ξt ∼ N(0, σP ), that accounts for the random perturbations – such as the arrival of
new information – that can possibly aect the market-maker’s decision making process.
2.3 Onedisadvantageof this linear formulation is thatprices canbecomenegative,which couldbeavoidedbyusing
a log-price formulation for the price discovery rule. Outstanding orders in any given trading interval are always
filled at the quoted prices and themarketmaker absorbs the excess or covers the shortfall, adjusting the prices
according to the impact Function 1 .
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Trading strategies
2.4 In stock markets, twomain investment approaches can be identified (Bonenkamp 2010):
• Fundamentalist trading – Fundamentalist investors argue that assets havean intrinsic value,which canbe
determined with a detailed analysis of the characteristics of the asset, its issuer and the market (Murphy
1999). The price is expected tomove around the fundamental value, sowhen both diverge an investment
opportunity appears: if the value exceeds the price the asset is said to be overvalued and it should be
bought; if the value is lower than the price, then it should be sold (Malkiel 1973).
• Technical analysis – This aproach builds on the analysis of past pricemovements to infere its future evolu-
tion. It claims that markets are driven by psychological factors – which reflect investors’ hopes and fears
– rather than fundamentals (O’Neill 2011). Technical analysis is much more recent than fundamentalist
trading; its use largely spread since the 60s and is has come to dominate the most modern and liquid
markets (Johnson et al. 2003).
2.5 Building on these trading approaches, we consider in themodel two types of investors: fundamentalist traders
(FUND) and technical traders (TREND). This combinationof strategies is relatively frequent in agent-basedmod-
els of financial markets as these are the mainstream trading approaches in stock markets (see, for example,
(Arthur et al. 1996,Lux & Marchesi 2000, or Farmer & Joshi 2002). We describe next in detail howwe implement
both types of agents in our model.
Fundamentalist traders (FUND)
2.6 Our implementation of the fundamental strategy is based on (Farmer & Joshi 2002). Fundamentalist investors
derive the intrinsic value of the stock from a private, exogenous signal they receive before each trading period.
This exogenous signal ismodelled as a randomwalk Vt plus an agent-specific constant vf that accounts for the
variability in the perception of the fundamental value:
V ft = Vt + v
f where Vt = Vt−1 + ηt, (2)
where ηt is drawn from a normal distribution with constant variance, ηt ∼ N(0, σV ), and the agent-specific
constant vf is set at the start of the simulation from a uniform distribution, vf ∼ U(vmin, vmax), with vmin =
−vmax.
2.7 The positions of fundamentalist traders are proportional to the dierence of actual price Pt to perceived fun-
damental value V ft . However, an agent only enters a position when the dierent between price and value is
above a given threshold, |V ft − Pt| > T f . In that case, the position is determined as3:
posft = V
f
t − Pt. (3)
2.8 Let’s note that when the price lies above the fundamental value, the asset is overpriced and the agent decides
to sell; when the price lies below the fundamental value, then the agent decides to buy.
2.9 Fundamentalist investors keep their positions open until the price and the fundamental value converge, that
is, until their dierence is smaller than a given threshold. In that case, the agents liquidate their position:
If posft−1 > 0 & V
f
t − Pt < τf then posft = 0.
If posft−1 < 0 & V
f
t − Pt > −τf then posft = 0.
(4)
2.10 In case an agent has an open position, but the liquidation condition is not satisfied, then it simply updates its
position based on the dierence between price and value: if this dierence has reduced (widened) since the
position was opened, then the investors also reduces (increments) its position:
posft = V
f
t − Pt. (5)
2.11 Fundamentalist investors are heterogeneous in their entry and exit thresholds
T f ∼ U(Tmin, Tmax), τf ∼ U(τmin, τmax).
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2.12 Once determined the new position, the agent calculates the order to be sent to the market-maker:
θft = pos
f
t − posft−1. (6)
2.13 Figure 1 summarises how the fundamentalist strategy works:
Figure 1: State diagram of the fundamentalist strategy.
Technical traders (TREND)
2.14 Technical traders exploit price trends, and for that aim we have implemented two of the most common tech-
niques in realmarkets (Taylor 2005): to detect the start of a trend in prices, agents compare a short- and a long-
termmoving average of past prices; to detect the end of a price trend, agents rely on the technique of channel
breakouts. To implement these rules, we have built on the practitioner literature, mainly on the description
provided in Kestner (2003).
2.15 At each time step, technical investors calculate two simplemoving averages (MA) of past prices: one short-term
MA that responds quickly to recent price movements, and a long-term MA that responds more slowly. Let wtrS
andwtrL be the windows used by the technical agent tr to calculate his short- and long-termmoving averages,
respectively. The moving averages are then given by:
MA(wtrS )t =
1
wtrS
·
t∑
i=t−wtrS +1
Pi
MA(wtrL )t =
1
wtrL
·
t∑
i=t−wtrL +1
Pi
(7)
2.16 When the twomoving averages cross, it is the key time to buy or sell: if the short-termMA crosses the long-term
MA from below, the agent interprets it as the beginning of an upward trend and opens a long position; if the
short-term MA crosses the long-term MA from above, the agent interprets it as the start of a downward trend
and opens a short position (Figure 2).
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Figure 2: Illustration of the behaviour of long- and short-termmoving averages.
2.17 When theMA’s cross and the agent opens aposition, it is proportional to thedierence in slopebetween the two
moving averages, because it is assumed that the greater this dierence, the steeper the upward or downward
price trend. Equations 8 and 9 specify the formula used by technical investors to calculate their position:
• IfMA(wtrS )t crossesMA(wtrL )t from below, then the agent opens a long position:
postrt = 25 · |∆incltrt | (8)
• IfMA(wtrS )t crossesMA(wtrL )t from above, then the agent opens a short position:
postrt = −25 · |∆incltrt |, (9)
2.18 where
• 25 is a normalisation factor aimed at having the same order of magnitude in the orders from fundamen-
talist and technical agents.
• ∆incltrt is thedierencebetween theslopeof the twoMA’s: ∆incltrt = arctan(MA(wtrS )t−MA(wtrS )t−1)−
arctan(MA(wtrL )t −MA(wtrL )t−1)
2.19 Technical investors keep their positions open until they think that the price trend has begun to reverse. In order
to detect a trend reversal, the agents use a channel breakout rule: if the current price is the lowest in the last
wtrC days, then the technical trader interprets that the price is going down, and any long position should be
liquidated; if the current price is the highest in the last wtrC days, then the technical trader interprets that the
price is going up, and any short position should be liquidated.
If postrt−1 > 0 & Pt == Minj∈[t−wtrC +1,t]{Pj} then postrt = 0.
If postrt−1 < 0 & Pt == Maxj∈[t−wtrC +1,t]{Pj} then postrt = 0.
(10)
2.20 Note that when drawing the minimum and the maximum of the price over a period, a channel appears, which
is why the method is called “channel breakout" (Figure 3).
2.21 As happens with the fundamentalist investors, when a technical agent has an open position, but the channel
breakout condition is not satisfied, then he simply updates his position keeping the same sign:
If postrt−1 > 0 then pos
tr
t = 25 · |∆incltrt |.
If postrt−1 < 0 then pos
tr
t = −25 · |∆incltrt |.
(11)
2.22 Technical investors are heterogeneous in the windows of the moving averages and breakout channel
wtrS ∼ U(wtrSmin, wtrSmax), wtrL ∼ U(wtrLmin, wtrLmax) wtrC ∼ U(wtrCmin, wtrCmax).
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2.23 Once set the new position, the agent calculates the order to be sent to the market-maker:
θtrt = pos
tr
t − postrt−1. (12)
2.24 Figure 4 summarises how the technical strategy works.
Figure 3: Illustration of the behaviour of the channel used as exit condition.
Figure 4: State diagram of the technical strategy.
Value-at-risk model
2.25 Up to this point, we have assumed that agents exclusively relied on valuationmodels to determine the number
of shares to buy or sell in any given time step. To account for themarket risk of the portfolio, we now introduce
a risk model based on VaR position limits. We assume that for a given portfolio and time horizon ∆th = th − t
the variation of the portfolio value is distributed normally with mean µ = 0 and normalised variance σ2t . An
estimate for the maximum loss of the portfolio value ValueP for the confidence level α is
VaRt = z1−α · ·ValuePt ·
√
∆th, (13)
where z1−α is the percentile of the normal distribution corresponding to a level of confidence equal to α.
2.26 Let θt be the order that an investor wants to issue according to its fundamentalist or technical strategy. Before
sending this order to the market maker, the agent calculates the 1-tick VaR of the position it would have in the
stock if the order θt became eective:
VaRt = z1−α · σt · |post−1 + θt| · Pt. (14)
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2.27 In case the VaR of the desired position (Equation 13) does not exceeds the VaR limit LVaR of the agent, the order
is sent to themarketmaker to calculate the new price; otherwise, the agent needs to reduce the order to a level
where the VaR of the resulting portfolio is below the limit (LVaR):
posredt = (post−1 + θt) ·
LV aR
V aRt
. (15)
2.28 Then the order actually sent to the market maker needs to be adjusted:
θredt = pos
red
t − post−1. (16)
2.29 Traders are heterogeneous in ther VaR limit and in the window used to calculate the volatility of the assets:
LVaR ∼ U(LVaRmin, LVaRmax), wσ ∼ U(wσmin, Uwσmax).
Measuring financial instability
2.30 The objective of this paper is to analyse whether countercyclical regulations contribute tomarket stability. It is
diicult to define what financial stability exactly is, but all the proposed definitions agree that financial stabil-
ity is linked to the absence of crises, stress or excessive volatility (Gadanecz & Jayaram 2008). It is even more
diicult tomeasure financial stability: to this aim, central banks and other regulators use indices that combine
simple indicators that provide information not only on financialmarkets but also on real economy or corporate
sector to account for the fact that financial stability is connected to the proper functioning of the macroeco-
nomic environment (Manamperi 2013)4. Ourmodel is just a stylised version of a stockmarket, and sowe cannot
implement stability indicators pertaining to any sector other than financialmarkets. Building on the real-world
indicators used by regulators in this sector, we will implement the following indicators of financial instability,
which essentially measure the intensity of price movements and the fragility of market participants:
• Return volatility: Market volatility, which measures the size of price movements (Gadanecz & Jayaram
2008), is the most usual indicator of financial stability (The World Bank 2013). We define volatility as the
standard deviation of the return series of an asset, r, calculated within a windoww:
σrt =
√√√√ 1
w − 1 ·
t∑
k=t−w+1
(rk − µrt )2, (17)
where µr is the average of returns r calculated within the same windoww.
• Return kurtosis5: Kurtosis of returns is the fourth central moment of the return distribution:
krT =
1
w ·
∑t
k=t−w+1(rk − µrt )4
(σrt )
4
, (18)
where µr is the mean and σr is the standard deviation of returns r, both calculated within the window
w. Kurtosis measures the size of the tails of the probability distribution of returns (Tsay 2005), and so it
has been used as an indicator of financial stability (Brunnermeier & Pedersen 2009; Peters 2014), since a
higher value of kurtosis is a sign of a higher frequency of extreme returns. However, itmust bepointedout
that kurtosis is quite sensitive to the appearance of outliers because the deviation of each observation
with respect to the mean is raised to the fourth power (Rebonato 2007).
• Hill tail index: Apart from kurtosis, the behaviour of the tails of the return distribution can be described
through the tail index. In recent years it has been determined that the complementary cumulative distri-
bution function of returns asymptotically follows a power law distribution (also sometimes called Pareto
distribution)6
F (x) = P (X > x) ∼ x−α
and so the descent of the probability density function also follows a power law distribution in the tails
with exponent α + 1 (Cristelli 2014). The exponent α coincides with the so-called tail index of the return
distribution, whichmeasures the order of the largest absolutemoment that is finite (for example, the tail
index of a normal distribution is∞ because all of its moments are finite, and the greater this index is, the
thinner the distribution tails are) (Cont 2001). The exponent α is usually estimated with the Hill index7,
which is the maximum-likelihood estimator of the tail index (Einarsson 2013). So, when the Hill index of
the return series takes a low value, it indicates that returns are more likely to take extreme values, what
is a sign of heightened instability (Hermsen 2010).
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• Investor strength: Building on the z-score used to measure the fragility of banks (Beck et al. 2011), we
define an indicator of investor strength as the ratio between the end-of-simulation accumulated profits
and the standard deviation of these final profits. This indicator provides an idea of the consistency of
traders’ results and so of their stability.
Parameters
2.31 Table 1 summarises the value of all the model parameters used in the results described next. When choosing
these values, we have applied the following criteria:
• For those parameters that are a direct adaptation of real strategy parameters, we have simply chosen
realistic values.
• For those parameters not ‘observable’ in real markets, we have adjusted their value with the aim of ob-
taining reasonable price dynamics that satisfy as much as possible the stylised facts of stock markets
(Cont 2001; Taylor 2005). In particular, the model captures the following properties:
– Lack of return autocorrelation: The autocorrelation function of the return series obtained from the
simulations tend to 0 when the lag increases.
– Fat tails: The distribution of the return series obtained from the model is more leptokurtic than the
normal distribution. Returns present excess kurtosis, and their histogram has more mass in the
center and the tails than a normal distribution.
– Volatility clustering: The autocorrelation function of volatility – estimated either as the absolute
value or the square of returns – remains positive for several lags, and volatility presents long-term
memory.
– Correlation between volume and volatility: The correlation between trading volume (calculated as
the sum of orders issued by all the agents in absolute value) and volatility is positive.
– Volume autocorrelation: The autocorrelation function of the volume series obtained from simula-
tions remains positive for several lags and decays slowly to 0, and volume has long-termmemory.
2.32 Next, we describe in more detail how we have calibrated each parameter8:
• Parameters associated to price formation: The impact of traders in price formation is normalised with the
liquidity parameter λ, so this parameter is linked to the number of agents (the higher the trader popu-
lation size, the higher the liquidity). Although this parameter has an empirical interpretation, its value is
not observable, and it has then been calibrated by looking at the stylised facts replicated by the model.
The random term in price formation (see Formula 1) is governed by the standard deviation parameterσP ,
whose value has been set to obtain an overall price volatility value in line with empirical daily volatility of
S& P500 (assuming here that one time step is equivalent to one trading day).
• Parameters associated to fundamental value formation: The fundamental value process depends on the
standard deviation termσV . This has been calibrated based on the stylised facts replicated by themodel.
• Parameters associated to the fundamentalist strategy: Although we do not have empirical evidence on
which thresholds are used by fundamentalist traders, we have used plausible values for the mispricing
level required to enter and exit a position (T f , τf ), and we have fine-tuned these values – together with
the unobservable parameter vf– by looking at the stylised facts replicated by the model.
• Parameters associated to the technical strategy: To implement the technical trading strategy, we have
built on techniques widely used in real markets, and so when it came to setting the values of the dier-
ent windows we turned to the practitioner literature. The windows for the short- and long-term moving
averages (wtrS , w
tr
L ) move around 10 and 40 as these are the values usually employed by real technical
investors (Kestner 2003); the window for the exit channel moves around 20 as this is the typical period
(Milton 2016).
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Parameter Value Parameter description
Nticks 4000 Number of ticks of each run
λ 400 Liquidity
P0 100 Initial price
σP 0.4 Standard deviation for random term in price formation
NFUND 200 Number of fundamentalist traders
NTREND 200 Number of technical traders
σV 0.25 Standard deviation for random term in fundamental value forma-
tion
[vmin, vmax] [-8, 8] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the dierence be-
tween the fundamental value and the value perceived by each fun-
damentalist trader
[Tmin, Tmax] [2, 5] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the entry thresh-
olds of fundamentalist traders
[τmin, τmax] [-0.5, 1] Boundaries of theuniformdistribution that sets the exit thresholds
of fundamentalist traders
[wtrSmin, w
tr
Smax] [5, 15] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the window of
short-termmoving average used by technical traders
[wtrLmin, w
tr
Lmax] [35, 50] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the window of
long-termmoving average used by technical traders
[wtrCmin, w
tr
Cmax] [5, 30] Boundaries of the uniformdistribution that sets thewindowof exit
channel used by technical traders
α 99% Confidence level
[LVaRmin, LVaRmax] Variable Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the VaR limit of
each agent
[wσmin, w
σ
max] Variable Boundaries of the uniform distribution that sets the window used
to calculate the stock volatility
Table 1: Table of parameters used in the simulations.
Eect of VaR Models
3.1 In this section we will show that the use of VaR position limits impacts price dynamics and market stability9.
For that aim, we will next study how an increasing use of VaR-based position limits has a noticeable eect on
the instability indicators described in Section 2.30.
3.2 Weconsider aone-assetmarketwhere theproportionof traders –both fundamentalist and technical investors –
thatmanage their riskwith VaR limits rises across experiments from0% to 100%. That is, in the first experiment
no agent uses VaR, whereas in the last experiment all agents are using VaR. We assume that all traders are
homogeneous in their VaR limit and volatility window:
LVaR = 40
wσ = 20
3.3 In all the experiments, simulations have a duration of 4000 time steps (in order to calibrate variables such as
price volatility we assume that each time step is equivalent to 1 day, and so each run has an equivalent dura-
tion of 16 years). Each experiment consists of 250 runs and uses the parameters listed in Table 1. We are using
identical random number sequences across the dierent experiments so that the results become comparable.
3.4 Figure 5 shows the evolution of the dierent instability indicators10 when the percentage of traders using a VaR
system increases from 0% to 100%. The four indicators show that the market becomes more unstable when
most traders manage their risk with VaR limits: the volatility of returns heightens, the kurtosis of returns rises
and their Hill tail index goes down – which indicates that extreme returns are more frequent –, and the index
of trader strength also worsens – because the dispersion of agent profits increases. When a high percentage of
traders are using VaR limits, the average market instability increases because of the emergence in some runs
of a particular price dynamics which we have called ‘VaR cycles’. In fact, the outliers observed in Figure 5 are
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realised in those runs where VaR cycles are specially remarkable. Let’s have a look at a particular simulation to
describe in detail the functioning of such cycles.
Figure 5: Evolutionof instability indicatorswhen thepercentageof agents using VaR increases from0%to 100%.
From top to bottom: return volatility, return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and agent strength index.
Description of a VaR cycle
3.5 Figure 6 compares the price time series obtained in a particular simulationwhen (1) no agent uses VaR limits (in
black), and (2) when all the agents use a VaRmodel with a limit LVaR = 40 and a volatility windowwσ = 20 (in
red). A dierent behaviour can be appreciated from t = 2400 onwards. For better clarity, a zoom of the price
series for t = 2500 . . . 2850 is provided in Figure 7 to appreciate the dierences in price dynamics.
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Figure 6: Comparison of price time series for a particular run when no agent uses VaR (in black), and when all
the agents use VaR (in red).
Figure 7: Zoom in t = 2500 − 2850 of the comparison of price time series for a particular run when no agent
uses VaR (in black), and when all the agents use VaR (in red).
3.6 Price behaviour from t = 2400 on is due to the trader action aer reaching their VaR limit. Figure 8 exhibits the
VaR of agents’ portfolio, averaged over fundamentalist and technical investors. This VaR is calculated with the
positions that agents would accumulate if they were allowed in the current time step to buy or sell the amount
dictated by their trading strategy. From t = 2400 onwards, agents’ VaR exceeds their LVaR limit – represented
with a horizontal, red line –, and so traders are forced to forget about their âĂŸdesiredâĂŹ orders and need to
reduce their portfolio to keep their VaR below the limit.
Figure 8: VaR time series of agents’ portfolio for a particular run, averaged over fundamentalist (in orange) and
technical (in green) traders.
3.7 Note that major price movements are caused by agents reducing their portfolio, but this does not mean that
price exhibits VaR cycles every time that an agent is forced to liquidate part of its positions. In fact, there are
JASSS, 22(1) 6, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3927
some fundamentalist agents that touch their VaR limit before t = 2400 and are thus forced to reduce their
positions, but the average VaR over all the fundamentalist population lies below the limit as seen in Figure 8. As
these reductions are small compared to the total trading volume, their impact onprice isminor. However, when
most agents accumulate substantial positions and their portfolio VaR is close to the limit, any small upsurge in
volatility can make VaR rise above the limit and force traders to liquidate positions. When a number of traders
must reduce their portfolio at the same time, these reductions have a noticeable impact on the price and, in
turn, on volatility.
3.8 Figure 9 shows the time series of price, return volatility and ‘forced’ portfolio reductions of fundamentalist (in
orange) and technical traders (in green). When these reductions are dierent from zero, it indicates that at least
someagents not only cannot send to themarket their ‘desired’ order – that is, the order dictatedby their trading
strategy –, but are forced to partially liquidate their positions to reduce their VaR to an acceptable level. It can
be observed that within the interval t = 2500 − 2850 – zoomed in Figure 10 –, the first substantial portfolio
reductions around t = 2550 push the price down and the volatility up, but this process keeps along for a while
because the increase in volatility rises again the VaR of agents, whichmust reduce again their positions, and so
on.
Figure 9: Time series of prices, annualised return volatility and portfolio reductions of fundamentalist (in or-
ange) and technical traders (in green) for a particular run.
3.9 Whenagentshave suiciently reduced their portfolio, their orders get smaller and thepricedecline slowsdown.
Volatility remains high while the window over which it is calculated still includes the first major movements in
price. Nevertheless, when time goes by and volatility decreases, traders start trading again as usual. If there is
some coordination between investors and they simultaneously buy or sell, then the price movements can be
substantial enough to raise again volatility and cause agents to reach their VaR limit. The ‘VaR cycle’ may thus
repeat oncemore (see for example the portfolio reductions around t = 2570, 2590, etc. which plunge the price
and raise the volatility).
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Figure 10: Zoom in t = 2500 − 2850 of the time series of prices, annualised return volatility and portfolio
reductions of fundamentalist (in orange) and technical traders (in green) for a particular run.
3.10 In the experiments just described we have seen that the higher the proportion of agents using VaR, the higher
the possibility that VaR cycles emerge, that is, episodes where the reduction of positions by some traders rises
the volatility enough to force other agents to sell o part of their holdings to reduce their exposure, thereby
increasing volatility again and reinforcing the destabilisation spiral. Given that the market is more likely to
suer instability bouts when all of the agents use a VaR system, our experiments suggest that, at the global
level, it would be more beneficial that not all of the investors control their positions with a VaR-based limit;
they could use other types of risk management models, or at least they could use more flexible limits that do
not force them to reduce their portfolio automatically when exceeding their risk threshold.
3.11 Theappearanceof VaRcycles largelydependson thevalueof theparametersusedby traders in their VaRmodel.
Wewill next summarise the eect of the volatility window and the VaR limit in the potential market destabilisa-
tion.
Eect of VaRmodel parameters
3.12 We will explore next the impact of a varying value of the window used to calculate volatility in the VaR model,
wσ , and of the position limit used by the agents to control the risk of their portfolio, LVaR. We summarise in
Figure 11 the behaviour of the dierent instability indicators when the VaR limit takes values from LVaR = 5 to
LVaR = 6511 and the window volatility takes values from wσ = 5 to wσ = 5012 days. In all the contour plots
the colour red identifies the most unstable situation (for example, the highest values of volatility or the lowest
values of the Hill index).
3.13 Several indicators point out that the most unstable scenario is achieved when investors use a small window to
calculate volatility and theymoreover use an intermediate VaR limit; return volatility andHill index are particu-
larly clear in this regard. On theonehand,whenvolatility is calculatedusinga smallwindow, that is, considering
just a few observations, each of these observations has a great weight in the outcome, and volatility turns out
to be very sensitive to recent price movements. So when the volatility window is small, VaR can significantly
increase from one tick to the next, whereas when volatility is calculated with a higher window, a much sharper
price variation is required for volatility to notice it. For this reason, using a medium- or long-term window to
calculate volatility highly reduces the appearance of VaR cycles and so improves market stability.
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3.14 On the other hand, the behavior of the various indicators leads us to conclude that the market is particularly
stablewhen the limits are either very restrictive or very loose. If the VaR limit takes a lowvalue, this considerably
constrains the positions that agents can take, because the VaR of their portfolio is proportional to the asset
positions. So, even though they reach their limit more frequently and are forced to reduce their portfolio, they
cannot send large orders to the market because their positions are not huge, and VaR-caused reductions have
a smaller eect in market dynamics. On the other hand, if the VaR limit takes a high value, then agents are
less likely to reach their limit, and so price dynamics do not dier much from the case in which agents do not
manage their risk (in fact, a scenario with a high enough VaR limit is equivalent to a model without VaR). It is
for intermediate values of the VaR that prices show themost interesting dynamics, with the appearance of VaR
cycles when the risk-driven portfolio reductions have a noticeable eect on prices and volatility. We note that
there is no need to consider unrealistic values of the VaR limit for instability episodes to appear: VaR cycles
are most likely to appear for LVaR = 11–14, which correspond approximately to 11% -45% of the average value
of traders’ portfolio, and in real markets it is quite probable that a financial institution facing losses of this
magnitude liquidates some positions to prevent that losses heighten.
Figure 11: Graphical summary of instability indicators when the VaR limit (x-axis) increases from 5 to 65 and the
volatility window (y-axis) increases from 5 to 50.
Can Regulation Counteract the Eects of VaR Models?
4.1 In Section 3we have seen that thewidespread use of VaR systemhas the potential to generate instability spirals
where agents are forced to reduce their portfolios when hitting their VaR limit, and these reductions move the
prices, increasemarket volatility and causeanewwaveof reductions that reinforcemarket instability. In viewof
theprocyclicality inducedby this typeof riskmanagementmodels,whoseuse inparticular is encouragedby the
Basel regulatory capital framework, thenewBasel III Capital Accord introduces twomeasuresaimedat reducing
the procyclicality of capital requirements: a countercyclical buer that urges banks to increase their capital
reserves during “good times" and reduces capital requirements when the situation worsens, and stressed VaR,
which adds an additional term to the calculation of market risk requirements that covers a period of special
financial turmoil.
4.2 In this sectionwewill study the eectiveness of two regulations that build on the two countercyclicalmeasures
introduced in Basel III: countercyclical VaR limits – based on the countercyclical buer (Section 4.4-4.8), – and
stressed VaR (Sections 4.9-4.15). To put to test both measures, we consider precisely the model configuration
where most indicators have shown that the use of VaR induces a greater level of instability. In Section 3 we
have seen that it is more likely that VaR cycles emerge for intermediate values of the VaR limit and for a small
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volatility window. For this reason, in the experiments described below we choose the following values of the
VaRmodel parameters:
LVaRmin = 30, LVaRmax = 40
wσmin = w
σ
max = 5
4.3 In this ‘adverse’ scenario we will better see if the proposed regulations are successful in stabilising the market,
and which one is more eective in this regard.
Countercyclical VaR limits
4.4 The principal objective of the Basel III countercyclical buer is to avoid the natural inclination for banks to
relax their risk control standards during periods of credit growth by urging them to increase their capital re-
quirements. In downturns, these requirements are reduced so that credit supply is not constrained and econ-
omy performance is not impaired (McCoy 2015). The adjustment of the countercyclical buer depends on the
macroeconomic conditions in which banks operate, and follows a rule-based approach combined with discre-
tionary judgement by national policymakers (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2017). As our model
does not consider the macroeconomic sector and cannot account for the discretion attributed to regulators,
we cannot implement the countercyclical buer as it stands in the Basel III Accord; instead, we will model a
rule-based regulatory mechanism that captures its essence and primary objective: countercyclical VaR limits.
4.5 Wenext consider a variation of themodel presented in Section 2where VaR limits are variable and are adjusted
according to the financial situation, using the same rationale behind the countercyclical buer: when themar-
ket is stable, VaR limits are reduced to prevent agents from accumulating excessive positions. When, on the
contrary, the market is unstable, VaR limits are risen to avoid that agents are forced to liquidate their positions
and exacerbate instability. To decide when the market is (or not) stable, agents compare the current volatility
to the historical volatility, and update their VaR limit according to the ratio between both volatility values:
LVaRt = LVaR0 · σt
σ¯t
(19)
4.6 To test the eect of this regulatory measure, we consider a market where the proportion of agents that use
countercyclical VaR limits rises across experiments from 0% to 100%. That is, in the first experiment no agent
uses countercyclical VaR limits, whereas in the last experiment all agents are using them. As said above, we
assume that all traders aremanaging their riskwithVaRusing thosevalues for the (initial) VaR limit andvolatility
windowwhich maximise market instability13.
4.7 Figure 12 shows the evolution of the dierent instability indicators14when thepercentage of traders using coun-
tercyclical VaR limits increases from0% to 100%. The four indicators show thatmarket stability improves when
more and more traders use countercyclical limits to manage their risk: the volatility of returns declines, the
kurtosis of returns goes down and their Hill tail index increases – which indicates that extreme returns are less
frequent –, and the indexof trader strength also rises – because there is less dispersion in agent profits. In fact, it
is suicient that half the population uses this regulatorymeasure to observe a noticeable recovery in instability
indicators, because the pressure to liquidate positions gets smaller and so VaR cycles are less likely to appear.
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Figure 12: Evolution of instability indicators when the percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits
increases from 0% to 100%. From top to bottom: return volatility, return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and
agent strength index.
4.8 Further to the results shown in Figure 12, we have conducted a series ofWilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests15 to com-
pare the mean instability of the market âĂŞ measured as the return volatility âĂŞ under dierent percentages
of agents using countercyclical VaR limits. Two-sided p-values obtained from each test are shown in Table 2,
where the percentages shown in row and columnheaders indicate the percentage of agents using countercycli-
cal VaR limits in the two scenarios being compared. We can observe that there is no significant dierence in
return volatility when the percentage of agents using countercyclical Var limits is similar (cells close to the diag-
onal of the table); however, an increase of only 20% in this percentage can produce a noticeable eect on price
dynamics that leads us to reject the null hypothesis and conclude that volatility is significantly dierent – in Ta-
ble 2wehave highlighted in yellowandorange those testswhere the null hypothesis is rejected at a significance
level of 0.05 and 0.01, respectively.
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Percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0% 0.26 <0.05 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
10% 0.26 0.20 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
20% <0.05 0.20 0.17 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
30% <0.01 <0.01 0.17 0.17 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
40% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.17 <0.05 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
50% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.05 0.12 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
60% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.12 0.11 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
70% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.11 0.23 0.09 0.12
80% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.23 0.65 0.79
90% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.09 0.65 0.84
100% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.12 0.79 0.84
Table 2: P-values obtained from the series of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests for return volatility. The
p-value reported in row x% and column y% is obtained from the WMW test with null hypothesis that return
volatility when x% of agents are using countercyclical VaR limits does not dier from when y% of agents are
using countercyclical VaR limits. Coloured cells indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected, at a significance
level of 0.05 (yellow cells) or 0.01 (orange cells).
Stressed VaR
4.9 In addition to the countercyclical buer, Basel III Accord introduces the stressed VaR to reduce the specific pro-
cyclicality caused by market risk requirements. The stressed VaR component is calculated as the VaR of the
current portfolio during a period of significant stress (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision 2010). It pro-
vides then an estimation of the maximum loss that the current portfolio could suer in the case of an extreme
event.
4.10 Stressed VaR is calculated using the samemethodology than the usual VaRwith the only dierence that instead
of building on recent volatility data it builds on historical volatility data belonging to a period of financial stress,
such as the crisis of 2007-08 when banks suered significant losses (Basel Committee on Banking Supervision
2010). Market risk capital requirements are then calculated as the sum of the usual VaR plus the stressed VaR.
This additional term increases the capital reserves to be held by banks and this is expected to have a positive
impact onmarket resilience.
4.11 To analyse the eectiveness of this measure, we will add a stressed VaR component to the risk management
system employed by the agents. Building on the specifications of Basel III Accord (Basel Committee on Banking
Supervision 2010), we calculate the stressed VaR (sVaR) as the usual VaR, but taking the most volatile period
since the start of the simulation to compute volatility. That is, we calculate stressed VaR following Equation 13
but replacing current value of volatility σt by its highest value since the start of the simulation. The total VaR of
the portfolio is then the sum of the usual VaR plus the stressed VaR, and agents must ensure at each time step
that this total VaR does not exceed their VaR limit LVaR.
4.12 To test the eect of this regulatory measure, we consider a market where the proportion of agents that use
stressed VaR rises across experiments from 0% to 100%. As done in the experiments with countercyclical VaR
limits, we assume that all traders are managing their risk with VaR using those values for the VaR limit and
volatility windowwhich maximise market instability16.
4.13 Figure 13 shows the evolution of the dierent instability indicators17 when the percentage of traders using
stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. The four indicators show that market stability improves when more
andmore traders add the stressed VaR component to their usual VaR. These results are qualitatively similar to
those obtained for the case of countercyclical VaR limits, and as observed in Section 4.4-4.8, it is suicient that
half the population uses this regulatory measure to observe a noticeable recovery in instability indicators. In
this case, theneed to keep total VaRbelow the limit restricts agents’ capacity for action and reduces thenumber
of VaR cycles.
4.14 When agents use stressed VaR, the total VaR of the portfolio increases because the additional term of stressed
VaR must be taken into account. In a sense, this has an eect similar to lowering the VaR limit, as agents must
make a harder eort to keep their positions at bay: if they accumulate higher positions, not only their usual
VaR increases, but also their stressed VaR, and in this situation it is easier to exceed the VaR limit and be forced
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to liquidate positions. This constrains agents’ positions, reduces their orders and – when the VaR limit is hit –
moderates the impact of their portfolio reductions on price. On the other hand, the additional term of stressed
VaR ismore ’constant’ than the usual VaR since it is calculated on the basis of themost volatile period and so it is
less likely to react to current volatility (unless it is a specially unstable moment). In this way the use of stressed
VaR decreases the emergence of VaR cycles and helps to stabilise the market.
Figure 13: Evolution of instability indicators when the percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from
0% to 100%. From top to bottom: return volatility, return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and agent strength
index.
4.15 As done in Section 4.4-4.8, we have also conducted a series of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney tests to compare the
instability of the market under dierent percentages of agents using stressed VaR. The results, summarised in
Table 3, exhibit a similar pattern: the null hypothesis gets rejected when slightly moving away from the table
diagonal, meaning that a small increase in the percentage of agents using stressed VaR tends to be suicient to
produce a significant reduction in market volatility.
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Percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0% 0.20 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
10% 0.20 0.14 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
20% <0.01 0.14 0.19 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
30% <0.01 <0.01 0.19 0.09 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
40% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.09 0.16 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
50% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.16 0.07 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
60% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.07 0.05 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01
70% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.05 0.12 <0.01 <0.01
80% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.12 <0.01 0.08 <0.01
90% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.08 0.38
100% <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 <0.01 0.38
Table 3: P-values obtained from the series of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests for return volatility. The
p-value reported in row x% and column y% is obtained from the WMW test with null hypothesis that return
volatility when x% of agents are using stressed VaR does not dier from when y% of agents are using stressed
VaR. Coloured cells indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected, at a significance level of 0.05 (yellow cells) or
0.01 (orange cells) .
Comparative analysis of countercyclical regulations
4.16 In Sections 4.4-4.8 and 4.9-4.15 we have analysed two regulatory measures aimed at reducing the procyclical-
ity of VaR systems: countercyclical VaR limits and stressed VaR. We have seen that both measures meet their
objective: when put to test under themost adverse scenario, both reduce noticeably market instability. In fact,
it is usually enough that half the population uses one of these measures for the instability indicators to show a
clear improvement.
4.17 But which of the two measures is more eective? To answer this question, in Figure 14 we summarise in a
comparative way the evolution of the dierent instability indicators when the proportion of traders that use
countercyclical limits or stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. This will allow us to better discern if one of
those twomeasures has a more palpable eect on counteracting the emergence of VaR cycles.
4.18 The various indicators reveal that the adoptionof countercyclical VaR limits and stressedVaRhas a similar eec-
tiveness in neutralising the impact of VaR cycles and reducemarket instability: all the indicators take compara-
ble valueswhen the proportion of agents that use one or the other regulatorymeasure increases, so it indicates
that both countercyclical mechanisms are equally eective.
4.19 To test if there is a statistically significantdierencebetween theeectsof countercyclical VaR limitsandstressed
VaR, we have run a series of WilcoxonâĂŞMann-Whitney tests with null hypothesis that return volatility when
x% of agents are using countercyclical VaR limits does not dier fromwhen the same percentage of agents are
using stressed VaR. P-values obtained from each test are shown in Table 4, where we can observe that there is
no significant dierence in return volatility when the percentage of agents using countercyclical Var limits or
stressed VaR is low to medium. Only when most agents are using one of these measures the null hypothesis is
rejected and we then can conclude that the eect of the two regulations is suiciently distinguishable from a
statistical point of view.
Percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits
0% 10% 20% 30% 40% 50% 60% 70% 80% 90% 100%
0.89 0.71 0.71 0.36 0.60 0.26 0.10 <0.05 <0.01 <0.01
Table 4: P-values obtained from the series of Wilcoxon-Mann-Whitney (WMW) tests for return volatility. The p-
value reported in columnx% is obtained from theWMW testwith null hypothesis that return volatility whenx%
of agents are using countercyclical VaR limits does not dier from when x% of agents are using stressed VaR.
Coloured cells indicate that the null hypothesis is rejected, at a significance level of 0.05 (yellow cells) or 0.01
(orange cells).
JASSS, 22(1) 6, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3927
Figure 14: Comparative evolution of instability indicators when the percentage of agents using countercyclical
VaR limits (in violet) or stressed VaR (in blue) increases from 0% to 100%. From top to bottom: return volatility,
return kurtosis, return Hill tail index, and agent strength index.
4.20 To complete the analysis we provide below in Figure 15 heatmaps of the dierent instability indicators that
show their evolution for a wider range of the (initial) VaR limit (LV aR0 = 5..65) and the volatility window
(wσ = 5..50). In the experiments run in Sections 4.4-4.8 and 4.9-4.15 we have focused on the combination
of parameters for which the market is more likely to suer VaR cycles, but the graphics in Figure 15 provide a
broader perspective on the behaviour of the indicators for other values of the (initial) VaR limit and the volatility
window.
4.21 To get a better idea of the eect of both regulatory measures, in Figure 15 we contrast the behaviour of the
four instability indicators with the baseline scenario where all agents use VaR with constant VaR limits (that is,
the case considered in Section 3), to see whether countercyclical VaR limits and stressed VaR reduce market
instability for any combination of the parameters LVaR and wσ , and to compare the extent of this reduction.
In all the heatmaps the colour red identifies the most unstable situation (for example, the highest values of
volatility or the lowest values of the Hill index), and to facilitate the comparative analysis, we use the same
scale in each row. In this way the graphics in Figure 15 provide a good insight on whichmeasure turns out to be
more eective for a broader range of parameters.
Discussion
4.22 The comparative analysis in Figure 15 has clearly shown that both the use of countercyclical VaR limits and
JASSS, 22(1) 6, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3927
Figure 15: Graphical summary of instability indicators when the (initial) VaR limit (x-axis) increases from 5 to 65
and the volatility window (y-axis) increases from 5 to 50.
stressed VaR reduce market instability not only in the scenario most prone to the appearance of VaR cycles (as
seen in Sections 4.4-4.8 and4.9-4.15), but also for the rest of values of the VaR limit and the volatilitywindow. As
already observed in Sections 4.16-4.21, the results obtained with countercyclical limits or stressed VaR appear
to be equally eective, both in the “critical" region of highest instability (that is, the read areas in the le-hand
graphics in Figure 15), and in the rest of scenarios.
4.23 We can conclude from this that the reformulation of capital requirements introduced in Basel III Accord, which
introduces the countercyclical buer and adds stressed VaR to usual VaR, is a wise decision to improve capital
standards and strengthenbank stability because it prevents or reduces the severity of high-instability episodes.
However, it must also be taken into account that these are strictmeasures, as they significantly increase capital
requirements, especially in the case of stressed VaR. Countercyclical VaR limits vary according to market fluc-
tuations andmay leavemore leeway to financial institutions during episodes of turmoil; however, the stressed
VaR always refers to a historical period of significant stress and therefore its value exceeds that of usual VaR
(and despite being less reactive to current volatility, it will tend to grow if instability increases).
4.24 So stressed VaR improvesmarket stability, but at the cost of constraining the freedom of action of traders, who
cannot accumulate large positions. In fact, stressed VaR has been criticised by the banking industry for the
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significant increase in the capital reserves theyneed tokeep (Choudhry 2013; Lobanov2012). This has an impact
not only at the individual level, but also at the global level, as market eiciency decreases. In Figure 16 we find
that the average distance between the time series of price and fundamental value goes up when the number
of agents that use stressed VaR increases, since the action of fundamentalist traders – who prevent price from
diverging from fundamental value – gets constrained and their ability to move the price towards fundamental
value diminishes. However, it is not the case when the proportion of agents that use countercyclical VaR limits
increases. This highlights that, although stressed VaR is an eective measure against financial instability, it
has side eects that cannot be ignored, and would provide support to those economists that advocate for the
adoption of countercyclical buers into the VaR model itself instead of the addition of the stressed VaR term
(Choudhry 2013).
Figure 16: Average distance between time series of price and fundamental value over 250 runs, when the pro-
portion of agents using countercyclical VaR limits (in violet) or stressed VaR (in blue) increases.
Conclusions
5.1 In recent times the use of riskmanagement systems has becomewidespread, and VaR has come to be themain
methodology at most financial institutions. VaR models assume that risk is exogenous, that is, prices are not
aected by actions of financial institutions that are trying to estimate the risk of their portfolio (Morris & Shin
2000; Daníelsson et al. 2001). This is possibly right most of the time, when investors trade with dierent strate-
gies and criteria. But it is precisely those (even if very rare) occasions when investors act in a uniform way that
are of interest, since traders’ aggregate action can move the prices and trigger an instability spiral. The use of
VaR systems is precisely one of themechanisms that contribute to homogenise the behaviour ofmarket partic-
ipants: when – for any reason – volatility goes up, so does the VaR of investors and in case it exceeds the limit,
agents are forced to reduce their portfolio at the same time. If, in addition, traders hold similar positions, the
way is paved for portfolio reductions to plunge the price, increase the volatility and raise again the traders’ VaR.
It is therefore a scenario of endogenous risk, since the use of VaR systems has the potential to amplify market
instability and feed it back.
5.2 In this article we have studied in which circumstances VaR systems do amplify price fluctuations, and have
tested the eectiveness of two regulatory measures aimed at improving the resilience of financial markets. To
this aim, we have built an agent-basedmodel, which can capture both the eect that market has on individual
investors as well as the global eect that emerges from the aggregation of individual actions. Indeed, the flex-
ibility of agent-based models to reflect the behaviour of individual agents and their interactions makes them
a more suitable approach for policy analysis than traditional, equilibrium-based models (Fagiolo & Roventini
2017).
5.3 We have considered a model of fundamentalist and technical traders which manage their risk with a simple
VaR model and must reduce their positions when the risk of their portfolio goes above a given threshold. We
have analysed the impact of the widespread use of VaR systems on dierent financial instability indicators âĂŞ
volatility, return kurtosis, Hill index of returns and trader strength âĂŞ and we have confirmed that, in a certain
number of runs, VaR models induce a particular price dynamics that rises market volatility. These dynamics,
which we have called ‘VaR cycles’, take place when a suicient number of traders reach their VaR limit and
are forced to simultaneously reduce their portfolio; the reductions cause a sudden price movement, upsurge
volatility and force even more traders to liquidate part of their positions due to the new increase of their VaR.
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This type of dynamics supports the theory that the generalisation of VaR systemsmay give rise to vicious circles
as claimed e.g. by Persaud (2000) or Daníelsson et al. (2001).
5.4 Economists and regulators have argued in the last years that countercyclical regulations should be introduced
to avoid this kind of vicious dynamics, and the Capital Accord of Basel III already implements two countercycli-
cal mechanisms to prevent banks from entering into riskier positions during calm periods. We have used our
model to test the impact of two regulatory measures based on these Basel III new countercyclical mechanisms
and study their eectiveness in reducing the procyclicality inherent to VaR systems:
• Use of countercyclical VaR limits: We have analysed the eect of traders using variable, countercyclical
VaR limits to control their positions. When themarket is stable, agents reduce their VaR limit to preclude
the accumulation of excessive positions, whereas they raise their limit when the market is more volatile
to avoid collective, simultaneous portfolio reductions.
• Stressed VaR: We have analysed the impact of traders adding a stressed VaR component – that is, VaR
calculated during a period of significant financial stress – to their risk management model.
5.5 Simulations have shown that an increasing adoption of both regulatory measures has a positive and compara-
ble eect on the various instability indicators considered in the paper. When most traders are using counter-
cyclical VaR limits or stressed VaR in their riskmanagement system, themarket becomes less prone to suering
VaR cycles and so its stability increases. On the basis of these results, we can conclude that the countercyclical
mechanisms introduced in Basel III Accord are a promising step towards improving capital standards inmarket
risk.
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Appendix: Robustness analysis
One diiculty associated to agent-based models is the calibration of the usually numerous set of parameters
against real data (Thurner 2011). In this section we analyse the robustness of the model results with respect
to changes in parameter values. To this aim, we perform a sensitivity analysis using the one-factor-at-a-time
methodology (Ten Broeke et al. 2016), varying one parameter at a time to observe its impact on results.
We use an extreme case analysis (Taylor 2009) where we choose an upper and lower bound for each parameter
and re-run the experiments to compare the results with the base case shown in Section 4. The extreme bounds
have been selected as the lowest and highest values of each parameter (1) that make sense (e.g., the long-term
window used by technical traders cannot be smaller than the short-term window), and (2) for which the basic
modelwhere agents usenoVaR still satisfies the stylised facts replicatedbyourmodel (for adescriptionof these
stylised facts, see Llacay & Peer (2018)).
Next, we repeat the experiments done in Sections 4.4-4.21 for the three values of parameters: the base value,
the lower bound and the upper bound. In Figure 17 - Figure 28 we provide a summary of the results: to avoid
repetitive figureswe only show the eect on return volatility as the other instability indicators behave similarly;
we have moreover opted for representing only the mean of this indicator (instead of the entire boxplot as in
Figure 12 - Figure 14) because this allows to neatly present the results under the three scenarios – base, low, and
high value of each parameter – on a single graph and facilitates their comparison. As it can be seen below, it
turns out that results are robust to other parameter choices, as Figure 17 - Figure 28 show the same qualitative
behaviour than those shown in Section 4.
Table 5 summarises the value of all the parameters used in the robustness analyses shown in Figure 17 - Fig-
ure 28.
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Parameter Base value Lower bound Upper bound Parameter description
λ 400 350 450 Liquidity
σP 0.4 0.1 0.7 Standard deviation for random term in price
formation
N 50 200 400 Number of agents, both in the fundamental-
ist and technical group
NFUND 200 150 250 Number of fundamentalist traders
NTREND 200 150 250 Number of technical traders
σV 0.25 0 0.5 Standard deviation for random term in fun-
damental value formation
[vmin, vmax] [-8, 8] [-0.5, 0.5] [-20, 20] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the dierence between the fundamen-
tal value and the value perceived by each
fundamentalist trader
[Tmin, Tmax] [2, 5] [1, 4] [7, 10] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the entry thresholds of fundamentalist
traders
[τmin, τmax] [-0.5, 1] [-1.5, 0] [0.5, 2] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the exit thresholds of fundamentalist
traders
[wtrSmin, w
tr
Smax] [5, 15] [2, 12] [10, 20] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the window of short-term moving aver-
age used by technical traders
[wtrLmin, w
tr
Lmax] [35, 50] [20, 35] [60, 75] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the window of long-term moving aver-
age used by technical traders
[wtrCmin, w
tr
Cmax] [5, 30] [1, 26] [15, 40] Boundaries of the uniform distribution that
sets the window of exit channel used by
technical traders
Table 5: Table of parameters used in the robustness analysis.
Figure 17: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
eter λ. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from 0% to 100%. Right: The
percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility is calculated over
250 runs.
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Figure 18: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
eter σp. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from 0% to 100%. Right: The
percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility is calculated over
250 runs.
Figure 19: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
eters NFUND and NTREND. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from 0% to
100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility
is calculated over 250 runs.
Figure 20: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
eterNFUND. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from 0% to 100%. Right:
The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility is calculated
over 250 runs.
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Figure 21: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
eterNTREND. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from 0% to 100%. Right:
The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility is calculated
over 250 runs.
Figure 22: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of param-
etersσV . Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from0% to 100%. Right: The
percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility is calculated over
250 runs.
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Figure 23: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of FUND
oset parameter [vmin, vmax]. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from
0% to 100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return
volatility is calculated over 250 runs.
Figure 24: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of FUND
oset parameter [Tmin, Tmax]. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from
0% to 100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return
volatility is calculated over 250 runs.
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Figure 25: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of FUND
exit threshold [τmin, τmax]. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases from0% to
100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%. Mean of return volatility
is calculated over 250 runs.
Figure 26: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of TREND
short-term MA window [wtrSmin, w
tr
Smax]. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits in-
creases from 0% to 100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%.
Mean of return volatility is calculated over 250 runs.
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Figure 27: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of TREND
long-term MA window [wtrLmin, w
tr
Lmax]. Le: The percentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits in-
creases from 0% to 100%. Right: The percentage of agents using stressed VaR increases from 0% to 100%.
Mean of return volatility is calculated over 250 runs.
Figure 28: Eect of the adoption of countercyclical regulations on return volatility for dierent values of TREND
exit channelwindow [wtrCmin, w
tr
Cmax]. Le: Thepercentage of agents using countercyclical VaR limits increases
from0%to 100%. Right: Thepercentageof agentsusing stressedVaR increases from0%to 100%. Meanof return
volatility is calculated over 250 runs.
Notes
1The Dodd-FrankWall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of 2010 also introduces changes tomake
minimum capital requirements countercyclical in the U.S (Kowalik 2011).
2Themodel code is available at https://github.com/gitwitcho/var-agent-model
3This implementation of the fundamental strategy is based on (Farmer & Joshi 2002).
4There is abundant literature on how to measure financial stability. The interested reader can refer to the
papers of Gadanecz & Jayaram (2008) or Dyrberg (2001) for a review of financial stability indicators, or to the
list of financial soundness indicators used by the IMF to assess the health of financial institutions (International
Monetary Fund 2006).
5In fact, we implement excess kurtosis, which is equal to krt − 3, where 3 is the kurtosis of a normal distribu-
tion.
6The notation∼ is used to describe the asymptotical behaviour of a function (Clegg 2006): f(x) ∼ g(x)→
limx→∞
f(x)
g(x) = 1
JASSS, 22(1) 6, 2019 http://jasss.soc.surrey.ac.uk/22/1/6.html Doi: 10.18564/jasss.3927
7Letk be thenumber of observations in the tail of a distribution. If these observations are sorted in descend-
ing order, x(1) ≥ x(2) ≥ · · · ≥ x(k), then the Hill estimator is defined as (Einarsson 2013):
αˆ = k∑k−1
i=1 (ln x(i))−(k−1) ln xk
8The calibration has been done before introducing the VaR model, to have a valid testbed where to study
the eect of risk management practices.
9For a more exhaustive analysis, please refer to Llacay (2015).
10Thevolatility/kurtosis/Hill indexboxplots showthestandarddeviation/kurtosis/Hill indexof theentire time
series of returns across the 250 runs. The line plot for the strength index shows the ratio of themean of the end-
of-simulation wealth across the 250 runs divided by its standard deviation.
11A VaR limit ranging from 5 to 65 is equivalent to setting the limit of losses to approximately 5% -66% of the
average value of traders’ portfolio.
12The value of the instability indicators shown in Figure 11 is an average over 250 runs for each pair of values
of VaR limit and volatilitywindow. In the case of the investor strength index, it is an average over the two groups
of agents (fundamentalist and technical traders).
13As in Section 3, all simulations have a duration of 4000 time steps, and each experiment consists of 250
runs and uses the parameters listed in Table 1. We are using identical random number sequences across the
dierent experiments so that the results become comparable.
14Thevolatility/kurtosis/Hill indexboxplots showthestandarddeviation/kurtosis/Hill indexof theentire time
series of returns across the 250 runs. The line plot for the strength index shows the ratio of themean of the end-
of-simulation wealth across the 250 runs divided by its standard deviation.
15We have opted for the nonparametric WilcoxonâĂŞMannâĂŞWhitney test instead of the more usual t-test
because our sample data does not satisfy the assumption of normal distributions required for conducting a
t-test.
16As in Section 3, all simulations have a duration of 4000 time steps, and each experiment consists of 250
runs and uses the parameters listed in Table 1. We are using identical random number sequences across the
dierent experiments so that the results become comparable.
17Thevolatility/kurtosis/Hill indexboxplots showthestandarddeviation/kurtosis/Hill indexof theentire time
series of returns across the 250 runs. The line plot for the strength index shows the ratio of themean of the end-
of-simulation wealth across the 250 runs divided by its standard deviation.
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